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ACCOMMODATING EQUALITY IN
THE UNIONIZED WORKPLACE@
By KATHERINE SWINTON*
This article explores the appropriate relationship
between human rights and collective bargaining laws
through an examination of the Supreme Court of
Canada's jurisprudence on the duty to accommodate.
While collective bargaining can be an important force
to promote equality for disadvantaged groups,
resistance to changing the terms of collective
agreements to accommodate those groups can arise,
expecially when other employees' seniority rights are
affected. The emerging jurisprudence suggests that
seniority rights will be respected in many situations,
especially in layoffs, but the article outlines
circumstances in which accommodation will be
necessary to vindicate equality rights.
Cet article examine la relation appropri~e entre les
droits humains et les lois concemant les conventions
collectives de travail par un examen de la jurisprudence
de la Cour supreme du Canada sur l'obligation de
l'accommodation. Bien que les n~gociations pour des
conventions collectives de travail puissent 8tre une
force importante A promouvoir l'6galit6 pour les
groupes d6favoris6s, la r6sistance aux changements
dans les termes des conventions pour l'accommodation
de ces groups peut surgir, surtout quand ils influent sur
les droits A l'anciennet6 des autres employes. La
jurisprudence naissante sugg~re que les droits A
l'anciennet6 seront respect6s dans plusieurs situations,
surtout en cas de licenciements, maiscet article dkcrit
des circonstances dans lesquelles l'accomodation sera
n6cessaire pour revendiquer les droits d'Cgalit6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian equality jurisprudence has been dramatically
transformed since the mid-1980s through judicial recognition of adverse-
effects discrimination and the concomitant duty to accommodate
members of groups protected by human rights legislation. While most
cases in the employment context have focused on the scope of the
employer's obligations, it was inevitable that the impact of the duty on
trade unions would arise in organized workplaces, since collective
agreement terms can adversely affect protected groups, giving rise to the
need to consider potential accommodation, including the waiver or
modification of those terms.
This raises the question of the appropriate relationship of
collective bargaining and human rights law. Some argue that it is unfair
to impose liability on unions who refuse to accept encroachment on a
collective agreement, either because its terms are seen as hard fought
"rights" bought by workers through concessions in negotiations, or
because the responsibility for any discriminatory action should be
attributed to management.1 Others concede the necessity for flexibility
in some, but not all, areas of collective agreement application, since
agreements tend to reflect the interests of the majority in a bargaining
unit and, thus, may not always be sensitive to the needs of groups which
are less well represented in the workplace. Therefore, some balancing of
the interests of various groups of workers is seen to be in order. Still
others, especially advocates for equality-seeking groups, argue that
collective agreements deserve no special respect in a regime concerned
about individual and group rights-indeed, the rules enshrined in
collective agreements often create unfair and arbitrary barriers to the
participation of disadvantaged groups.
1 There is an obvious contradiction between these two positions which will be examined in
greater detail infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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In no way has this debate been more heated than with respect to
the benefits and protection flowing from seniority systems. For many,
seniority is "the most fundamental right that organized workers
have"-and is itself an important method of promoting equality.2 Yet
from the perspective of many members of disadvantaged groups,
seniority is a major barrier in the struggle to achieve a more equal and
accessible workplace.3
The appropriate treatment of seniority was an important
element in the legislative debate on Ontario's Employment Equity Act.
4
This statute, a novel and ambitious effort to promote equality in
employment for groups disadvantaged by both intentional and systemic
discrimination, imposed a positive obligation on affected workplaces to
develop an employment equity plan. The Act required employers, in
conjunction with bargaining agents in a unionized workplace, to identify
and remove barriers to the employment of members of the designated
groups-women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal people, and racial
minorities-and to set goals and timetables to achieve representation of
those groups in the workplace reflective of their representation in the
community.5 Despite the opposition of many equality-seeking groups,
the Act provided that the use of seniority with respect to layoffs and
recalls is deemed not to be a barrier, while seniority rights in other
contexts, such as hiring and promotion, are deemed not to be barriers
unless they are found by a board of inquiry to discriminate under the
Ontario Human Rights Code.6
2 P. Nash & L. Gottheil, "Employment Equity: A Union Perspective" (1994) 2 Can. Lab. L.J.
49 at 54.
3 This is implicit, for example, in D. Baker & G. Sones, "Employer Obligations to Reinstate
Injured Workers: Relating Human Rights Legislation to Section 54b of the Workers' Compensation
Act, R.S.O. 1980, [c.] 539, as am. by S.O. 1989, c. 47" (1990) 6 J.L. & Social Pol'y 30 at 54 (criticizing
the Ontario Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11, protection of seniority when injured
workers seek reinstatement).
4 Employment Equity Act, S.O. 1993, c. 35, as rep. by S.O. 1995, c. 4, effective 14 December
1995 [hereinafter Employment Equity Act]. A similar provision was included in the new federal
Employment EquityAct, S.C. 1995, c. 44, s. 8 (not yet proclaimed in force), although with one change
in s. 8(3)--even though seniority may be protected by the preceding subsections, parties have a duty
to consult if seniority has an adverse impact on employment opportunities for designated groups.
5 Employment EquityAct, supra note 4, ss. 2 and 12.
6 Ibid. s. 11(3) and (4); and Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 [hereinafter Ontario
Human Rights Code]. The provision of the Employment Equity Act, ibid., regarding layoffs was a
part of the bill from the beginning, but the protection for seniority in promotions and hiring was a
third reading addition. Indeed, in earlier versions of the bill, seniority systems were identified as a
potential barrier: see Bill 79,An Act to provide for Employment Equity forAboriginal Peoplk People
with Disabilities, Members of Racial Minorities and Women, 3d sess., 35th Leg., Ontario, 1993, cl.
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Is this a retrograde decision to be avoided by other jurisdictions
seeking to implement employment equity? Or is this simply a proper
acknowledgement that seniority is generally consistent with human
rights legislation? An answer takes us back to the debate about the
relationship between collective bargaining and human rights, requiring
an examination of the role of unions in the pursuit of equality and the
emerging meaning of equality in human rights jurisprudence.
This article begins with an examination of that jurisprudence,
with particular emphasis on adverse-effects discrimination and the duty
to accommodate. This is followed by a discussion of the interaction of
collective bargaining and equality rights. I argue that unions often play a
positive role in promoting equality, despite the obvious constraints
deriving from their majoritarian and political nature. But human rights
laws are also important to check majoritarianism in some circumstances,
as illustrated by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud,7 which held that
unions, as well as employers, have a legal duty to accommodate.
Although that case did not deal directly with seniority, I will go on to
discuss the various ways in which seniority systems may come under
human rights scrutiny-indirectly, in order to accommodate someone
suffering discrimination from another workplace rule, or directly, when
the use of seniority in decision making is itself attacked as a form of
adverse-effects discrimination. Finally, I will speculate about where
boards and courts are likely to require modification of seniority systems,
concluding that Ontario's decision in the Employment Equity Act with
respect to seniority in promotions and hiring was an unfortunate one.
II. THE MEANING OF EQUALITY
Discussions of the meaning of equality often make a sharp
distinction between equality of treatment and equality of results, or
between direct and indirect discrimination.8 Commentators often
41(1), para. 5 (1st reading 25 June 1992).
7 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [hereinafter Renaud].
8 It is trite, but true, to say that equality is a highly contested concept. As a result, the
terminology in the literature is by no means consistent. Some speak of formal versus substantive
equality: see, for example, C. Sheppard, Study Paper on Litigating the Relationship Between Equity
and Equality (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993) at 4-5; others speak of equality of
opportunity versus equality of outcome, or equality of process versus equality of results. For useful
descriptions of the debate, see K.W. Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331; and O.M. Fiss,
"Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" (1976) 5 Phil. & Publ. Aff. 107.
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emphasize the bright line between the two approaches, arguing that the
goal of eradicating direct discrimination is to maximize the liberty of the
individual and to make group membership irrelevant, while adverse
effects, or indirect, discrimination emphasizes the salience of the group
and demands "special treatment" in the form of accommodation for
those who have suffered disadvantage because they are "different" from
the majority.
In fact, this distinction is too stark, as the following discussion
illustrates. With both direct and indirect discrimination, group
experience and membership are of fundamental importance because it is
the history of particular groups that shapes our equality laws. The policy
decision to protect certain characteristics in anti-discrimination law, such
as race or religion, but not others, is driven by the experience of those
sharing protected traits. It is overwhelmingly women, racial minorities,
older workers, or those with disabilities who need protection, not those
with green eyes or blonde hair, because characteristics like sex, race, or
age have historically resulted in stereotyping and hostile treatment in
Canadian society. Moreover, women, racial minorities, and people with
disabilities have often been less well represented in the political process
or other decision-making institutions, with the result that their interests
may have been inadequately considered when rules were established.
Therefore, to give such individuals a fair chance-true equality of
opportunity-the detrimental impact of rules on less powerful groups
needs to be considered. As a result, equality law must be concerned with
both individuals and groups.
Nevertheless, it is true that the equal treatment model more
clearly emphasizes fairness to the individual, since the primary objective
is to stop adverse treatment based on the fact of membership in a group
identified as warranting protection. Where the motive is antipathy
toward that group or stereotypical attitudes about its members' abilities,
anti-discrimination law intervenes to protect the individual against unfair
treatment.9 However, the law does recognize that there may be
circumstances where there is reasonable justification for treating this
group differently-for example, because its members do not have the
9 See Fiss, supra note 8 at 108-28 (describing the anti-discrimination principle and reasonable
classification in American law); and R.H. Fallon Jr. & P.C. Weiler, "Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting
Models of Racial Justice" [1984] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 at 12-18 (describing an individual justice model,
again in the American context). For an example of a strong proponent of this model in Canada, see
R. Knopff, Human Rights and Social Technology: The New War on Discrimination (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1989).
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ability to perform necessary job requirements.10 Overall, the goal is to
have the individual judged on merit, without being unfairly burdened
with the social baggage of assumptions about membership in a particular
group.
This concept of equality is a powerful one, as acknowledged even
by many who are conscious of its limitations.11 It is illustrated in
Canadian human rights law by cases such as Borough of Etobicoke, which
struck down a mandatory retirement rule for firefighters on the basis
that the employer had failed to prove that age was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).12 In this and subsequent cases, the
Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that employers should make
decisions on the basis of individual merit whenever possible, rather than
relying on generalizations about groups identified by characteristics
listed in human rights codes, unless such characteristics are proven
relevant to job performance or individual testing of qualifications is
impossible. 13
In sharp contrast to the equal treatment model, in much of the
literature, is an emphasis on equality of results and/or "substantive
10 This idea of justifiable differential treatment is caught in the bona fide occupational
qualification defence found in human rights legislation (for example, Ontario's Human Rights Code,
supra note 6, s. 24(1)(a) and (b)), or the concept of reasonable limits, or an absence of a finding of
discrimination under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, ss. 1 and 15 [hereinafter
Charter].
11 See, for example, writing about American blacks, Crenshaw, supra note 8 at 1366; or F.
Michelman, "The Meanings of Legal Equality" in F.E. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1985
(Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1987) at 85. A good example of the powerful attraction of this view of
equality is the claim for recognition of same-sex relationships in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513.
12 Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Etobicoke (Borough of), [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202
[hereinafter Borough of Etobicoke].
13 McIntyre J. for the Court stated, ibkt at 208, that the job requirement must be "reasonably
necessary to assure the efficient and economical performance of the job without endangering the
employee, his fellow employees and the general public" Subsequent cases emphasized the need for
individual testing and avoidance of overbroad generalizations about certain groups: see, for
example, Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Saskatoon (City oD, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1297 at
1313-14 [hereinafter Saskatoon Firefighters] (dismissing a complaint of age discrimination with
respect to mandatory retirement for firefighters, since individual testing was not feasible); and
Brossard (Town of) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 278 at 317-18
[hereinafter Brossard] (striking down a rule preventing the hiring of relatives of town employees and
councillors because it was too broad and should be tailored to apply to situations in which there was
a potential for conflict of interest if family members were hired).
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equality."14 These models seem to be more clearly attuned to the needs
and interests of groups because of the underlying premise that our laws
and institutions often reflect the unstated preferences and values of
dominant groups-usually those of white, able-bodied males. When
measured against these norms, members of other groups have
traditionally been found to be "different" or unqualified and, therefore,
undeserving of further concern under the equal treatment model.15 For
example, a health and safety law requiring all employees in underground
mines to wear hard hats for safety reasons would be acceptable, even if it
would exclude from employment in mines members of certain religions,
such as Sikh men whose religion requires them to wear the turban.
Similarly, a rule requiring all employees to pass a written test in a fixed
period of time might exclude those with certain visual disabilities.
Under the equal treatment model, they would be regarded as "different"
from others and not qualified.
Substantive equality, in contrast, is concerned about the
implications of "difference," and particularly the impact of existing rules
and practices on groups historically disadvantaged in society. Rather
than ignore difference in cases like those described above, the concern
becomes the alleviation of adverse effects on the disadvantaged
group-for example, through exemption from the hard hat rule for
Sikhs, or an alternative evaluation method for the person with a visual
disability.16 But this still leaves unanswered the important questions of
when adverse effects on groups should trigger the attention of the law
and how much accommodation is required. This, in turn, requires us to
reconsider the underlying vision of equality.
14 These concepts are not necessarily the same, as further discussion will show. Elsewhere in
the literature, these concepts may be described as a group parity principle (Michelman, supra note
11), or an anti-subordination approach (Fiss, supra note 8).
15 See M. Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990) at 16 and 51-52, for a discussion of the "unstated norm."
16 See ibid or other feminist writers such as G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality
Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, 1989) at 38, who are concerned about differences in power between groups
that result in unfavourable norms for the disadvantaged groups. The equal treatment model is
described as "assimilationist" because it measures members of all groups against a particular rule:
see C. Geller, "Equality in Employment for Women: The Role of Affirmative Action" (1990-91) 4
C.J.W.L. 373 at 389. Although the term "affirmative action" is often used pejoratively, it is
important to recognize that the equal treatment model has powerful transformative effects when
members of disadvantaged groups win a case that says "[w]e are like you." Nevertheless, the model
does not go far enough to deal with real differences between groups, whether physical or cultural,
where accommodation is required to provide fair opportunity.
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At its most modest, intervention to remove adverse effects is
justified to prevent arbitrary action that aggravates the disadvantage
experienced by a group. To the extent that an unnecessary requirement
presents a hurdle to an already disadvantaged group, fairness requires
that it be removed to provide equal opportunity for all individuals.
Think, for example, of a qualification that all police officers be six feet
tall. This might not seem much of a problem if one assumes police
officers are male. But if one starts with the proposition that police work
should be open to men and women and to all races, the height rule
seems quite unfair if, on closer examination, it turns out to have a
tenuous relationship to the competence of police officers, given the wide
variety of tasks that they perform. Thus, in pursuit of equal opportunity
for all groups, it seems reasonable to demand the removal of arbitrary
job requirements that have an adverse effect on protected groups. 7
But if the concept of equality stopped here, serious obstacles
would still stand in the way of many groups seeking to participate in
workplaces or to receive other benefits, for employers will often be able
to make the argument that the rule or practice under scrutiny is justified
and not arbitrary. For example, a hard hat requirement may well protect
workers from injury.' 8 But if we believe that a truly equal society is one
in which there should be a fair chance at participation for women,
religious minorities, or persons with disabilities, then equality law
demands closer scrutiny of rules and practices to see if it is feasible to
provide that opportunity, even when a rule serves some institutional
purpose. This will require us to consider the possibility of exemption
from a rule that might otherwise seem reasonable, as in the hard hat
requirement. At other times, it may require us to think about further
changes to institutions and practices-for example, through the creation
of another form of evaluation for the person with a visual disability or
protective reassignment for the pregnant worker to remove her from
exposure to toxic substances.
17 Early American examples of such cases are Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
[hereinafter Griggs] (educational qualifications and testing adversely affecting blacks); and Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements for prison guards
disproportionately affecting women). Language in Griggs, at 429-30, implies that the failure to
remove a rule with a serious disparate impact on a disadvantaged group, when there is little or no
justification for it, raises an inference of intentional discrimination against that group. A helpful
discussion of "static discrimination" is found in M. Kelman, "Concepts of Discrimination in
'General Ability' Job Testing" (1991) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1157 at 1160-65.
18 Indeed, even in a case like Griggs, supra note 17, there is a good argument that an
educational qualification is a useful screening device, as argued in Knopff, supra note 9 at 103-06.
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But the question then becomes how far we must go to
accommodate difference and, when competing considerations come in,
how far to limit the duty to accommodate? Is the overriding goal to
achieve a level of representation for these groups in jobs or educational
institutions reflective of their numbers in a broader population-in other
words, equality of results?19 Some advocates place the highest priority
on the participation of groups they identify as disadvantaged, and thus
they are willing to sacrifice significant elements of merit or accept
extensive costs as the price to pay for equality.20 If so, this pushes
towards a dramatic transformation of social institutions to remove
adverse-effects discrimination-and, in the process, raises very serious
questions about the legitimacy and feasibility of achieving such change
through adjudication.21
Realistically, though, principles dealing with the costs of
accommodation and the validity of competing interests will have to be
developed, just as they have been with respect to the equal treatment
model and defences to direct discrimination? 2 Even if one would like a
fully representative workforce, that is an unfeasible ideal.
Accommodation of some disabilities in a workplace may, for example,
entail significant costs, lost productivity, or risk of harm to other
workers-and some jobs just cannot be done by persons with some
19 That seems to be the implication from Sheppard, supra note 8 or Geller, supra note 16.
Sheppard, at 5, writes: "[The concept of substantive equality] demands real, actual equality in the
social, political, and economic conditions of different groups in society, as opposed to a formal,
abstract, and theoretical ideal of individual equality ... . The legal right to equality, therefore,
embodies a right to have one's group differences acknowledged and accommodated in laws, and
social and institutional policies and practices."
20 Thus, they might argue for affirmative action programmes that give preference to members
of target groups in employment or education, as does Geller, supra note 16. Note that advocates of
this position are often quite suspicious of the concept of "merit" and the discriminatory assumptions
it may embody.
21 Many commentators ignore this issue, but it is discussed in relation to the interpretation of
s. 15 of the Charter in R. Moon, "Discrete and Insular Right to Equality: Comment on Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia" (1989) 21 Ottawa L Rev. 563 at 569 and 574-75.
22 For example, Fiss, supra note 8 at 148-67, would limit disparate impact analysis (or anti-
subordination approaches) to a distinct social group (defined as having a distinct identity and a
condition of interdependence among its members) which is in a perpetual position of subordination
and lacking in political power. A law should be constitutionally vulnerable only if the status of the
disadvantaged group is worsened by its effect. Finally, he concludes that consideration must be
given to competing interests, so that a compelling benefit to the legitimate interests of the state
could outweigh the disadvantaged group's claim to protection.
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disabilities.23 Some members of groups suffering ongoing harm due to
past discrimination, like blacks in the United States or Aboriginal people
in Canada, may be unable to meet the same educational or employment
standards as white candidates, again leading to a necessary debate about
the importance of merit and productivity versus compensation for past
discrimination.
Others argue that proportional representation of groups is
neither an achievable nor a desirable goal of equality law.24 Rather, the
objective is more modest and more closely linked with the underpinnings
of the equal treatment model: the goal is equal opportunity for members
of all groups by giving them a fair chance to participate.2 5 From this
perspective, it is unjust to insist on the status quo when it is relatively
costless to adopt alternative institutional arrangements that alleviate
adverse effects on disadvantaged groups-for example, by rearranging
furniture to permit wheelchair access. But, at the same time, it is
recognized that accommodation can raise complex and competing
considerations. Costs to employers cannot be ignored in any system,
especially not in a capitalist one; other individuals and groups may be
affected by the accommodation or themselves require another
arrangement, and it may be impossible to respond to all the diverse
needs and views-even within a group seeking accommodation.2 6 Thus,
while the goal is substantive equality, this approach plays out as an
enriched concept of equal opportunity that balances a number of
interests in its implementation.27
23 For example, a person with a serious back injury who could not lift more than five pounds
and needed an hourly fifteen-minute rest would attract concerns about productivity and costs of
production in most plants where repetitive lifting of packages over ten pounds was the norm.
Similarly, a person subject to periodic, serious epileptic seizures might create real risks to himself or
herself and others in a plant where heavy machinery was being operated. See, for example, Re
Canada Post and cupw (Godbout) (1993), 32 L.A.C. (4th) 289 (Jolliffe) [hereinafter Canada Post];
and Re .c.c. Bottling Ltd. and RWDSu, Local 1065 (1993), 32 LAC. (4th) 73 (Christie).
24 For example, McLachlin J., in plurality reasons in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 at
487, emphasizes that Charter equality rights are aimed at individual protection, not group rights.
2 5 This is the thrust of Report of the Commission on Equality in Employment (Ottawa: Minister
of Supply and Services, 1984) (Commissioner: Abella J.) at 4-5 [hereinafter Abella Report]. This
report led to federal employment equity legislation and has been cited in many court decisions. It is
also the theme in M.D. Lepofsky, "Understanding the Concept of Employment Equity: Myths and
Misconceptions" (1994) 2 Can. Lab. L.i. 1 at 7-10.
26 For example, a rotating-shift schedule may be a barrier to the participation of some women
with small children and no problem to others with different childcare arrangements.
27See Kelman, supra note 17 at 1160 and 1182 (describing "dynamic discrimination"), and at
1161 and 1186-95 (describing "distributive discrimination").
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The following section of this paper shows how the Supreme
Court of Canada has embraced substantive equality in the context of
employment law, ultimately developing an approach that emphasizes
equality of opportunity and removal of barriers, rather than equal
results.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE
In a creative exercise of judicial interpretation, the Supreme
Court of Canada, in its O'Malley decision, first held that the prohibition
of discrimination in Canadian human rights codes encompassed indirect,
or adverse-effects, discrimination, as well as direct or intentional
discrimination 28 Thus, in situations where a rule or practice has an
adverse impact on members of a protected group, constituting prima
facie discrimination, the person responsible for the rule or practice has a
duty to take "reasonable steps" to accommodate the protected group up
to the point of "undue hardship"-that is, in a case of employment,
without undue interference in the operation of a place of business and
without undue expense.2 9 Thus, a substantive model of equality was
added to the existing equal treatment jurisprudence.
In O'Malley, the claim of religious discrimination arose because a
retail clerk, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, refused availability for
work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday in order to observe her
Sabbath. The adverse-effects discrimination resulting from the job
requirement that she work two out of three Saturdays necessitated some
effort at accommodation by the employer. Since there was no evidence
of any attempt to accommodate, the employer essentially lost due to its
failure to discharge the onus of proof. As a result, the Supreme Court's
reasons contained no real discussion of what constitutes undue hardship.
In the Central Alberta Dairy Pool case, the Court began to
elaborate the duty to accommodate and the meaning of "undue
hardship,"'3 0 although in the interim there was much confusion as to
whether the duty to accommodate would arise in cases of direct, as well
28 O'Malley v. Simpson's-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 [hereinafter O'Malley]. By the time
this decision was handed down, some human rights codes, including Ontario's, already expressly
included adverse-effects discrimination.
29 Ibid at 555.
30 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489
[hereinafter cZADP].
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as indirect, discrimination. In Bhinder, a case decided at the same time
as O'Malley, the Court had held that there was no duty to accommodate
under the Canadian Human Rights Act,31 once an employer established
that a workplace rule or requirement was a bona fide occupational
qualification or requirement3 2 The employer was found to have a valid
defence to a complaint of religious discrimination by an adherent of the
Sikh religion, who refused to wear a hard hat while working as a
maintenance electrician because his religion required that he wear a
turban. Since there were valid safety reasons for the hard hat
requirement, the Court held that the employer had no duty to
accommodate Bhinder in some way-for example, by exempting him
from the rule, while requiring other employees to comply.
The Bhinder case was very controversial, since it seemed to
provide a defence for many workplace rules that imposed serious
burdens on protected groups, especially those with disabilities and
religious minorities.33 Some relief appeared in subsequent cases, such as
S
askatoon Firefighters and Brossard,3 4 which emphasized that an employer
could not satisfy the BFOQ test unless it could be shown that reliance on a
suspect criterion (age or civil status in those two cases) was rationally
connected to the performance of the particular job at issue and, more
importantly, that there was no practical alternative to the use of that
criterion-for example, individual testing of capacity or a less restrictive
method of reaching the same employment objective. Thus, there was
greater potential to call existing workplace structures into question
because of their impact on disadvantaged groups,3 5 but it was unclear
whether this raised doubts about the holding in Bhinder.
In cAmP, the Court provided some clarification of these issues,
but still left unanswered many questions about the scope of the duty to
accommodate. Wilson J., writing for the majority, continued to
emphasize the difference between direct and indirect discrimination,
insisting that the duty to accommodate only arose in relation to the
31 S.C. 1976-77, c. 33 (now R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6).
32 Re Bhinder and Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 at 590 and 580
[hereinafter Bhinder].
33 M.F. Yalden, "The Duty to Accommodate: A View from the Canadian Human Rights
Commission" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. LJ. 283 at 288-89.
3 4 Supra note 13.
35 Ile inquiry seems reminiscent of the Charter jurisprudence under s. 1 and the test in R. v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 138-40, since a major concern is whether there is a reasonable
alternative to the use of the suspect criterion that is less burdensome to that group.
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latter.36 However, she held that Bhinder had been wrongly decided,
because the Court had applied the BFOQ defence in a case of adverse-
effects discrimination, while that defence should only be applied with
respect to direct discrimination. In her view,
[w]here a rule discriminates on its face on a prohibited ground of discrimination, it
follows that it must rely for its justification on the validity of its application to all
members of the group affected by it. There can be no duty to accommodate individual
members of that group within the justificatory test because, as McIntyre J. pointed out [in
Bhinder], that would undermine the rationale of the defence. Either it is valid to make a
rule that generalizes about members of a group or it is not.
37
In cases of adverse-effects discrimination, she stated, the rule itself was
not in question, provided that it was rationally connected to the needs of
the business operation. However, its application must be modified
because of the burdens on members of a particular group, if this
accommodation could occur without undue hardship.38
As to what constitutes undue hardship, the Court began to
elaborate relevant factors, with Wilson J. stating:
I do not find it necessary to provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes undue
hardship but I believe it may be helpful to list some of the factors that may be relevant to
such an appraisal. I begin by adopting those identified by the board of inquiry in the case
at bar: financial cost; disruption of a collective agreement; problems of morale of other
employees; interchangeability of work force and facilities. The size of the employer's
operation may influence the assessment of whether a given financial cost is undue or the
ease with which the work force and facilities can be adapted in the circumstances. Where
safety is at issue both the magnitude of the risk and the identity of those who bear it are
relevant considerations. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and the results which
will obtain from a balancing of these factors against the right of the employee to be free
from discrimination will necessarily vary from case to case. 9
As in O'Malley, the issue was religious discrimination, this time
arising from the refusal to give an employee in a milk-processing plant a
holy day off, which happened to fall on Easter Monday, to allow him to
36 Direct discrimination, she stated, in CADP, supra note 30 at 514, was based on a
generalization about the capacities of a particular group. A rule that consciously made a distinction
on the basis of a suspect ground could stand only if it was justified in application to the group as a
whole. But if a rule was suspect because of its impact on a protected group, it could continue to
stand, except with respect to those adversely affected, who must be accommodated if the employer
could do so without undue hardship.
3 7Ibid. at 514.
38 In contrast, Sopinka J. wrote the dissenting judgment, ibid. at 527, La Forest and McLachlin
JJ. concurring, in which he stated that the duty to accommodate was an element of the BFOQ
defence, which applied to both indirect and direct discrimination. Dickson C.., L'Heureux-Dub6,
and Cory JI. concurred with Wilson J.
39 /bid at 520-21.
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observe the tenets of the World Wide Church of God. Again, there was
little discussion of the duty to accommodate, since the Court quickly
concluded that the employer could have accommodated this isolated
request for a day off, even though Monday was its busiest production
day, since the employer routinely handled employee absences, vacations,
and emergencies on Mondays.
The Court's decision generated comment and criticism once
again, most particularly in relation to the relevance of factors such as
employee morale and the existence of a collective agreement to the duty
to accommodate, as well as the continuing insistence that there is no
duty to accommodate in relation to direct discrimination. 40 Some of
those criticisms were addressed in Renaud, where the Supreme Court of
Canada revisited the duty to accommodate, this time in a unionized
setting. Sopinka J. for the Court noted that undue hardship went
beyond the American de minimis standard, since "[m]ore than mere
negligible effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate." 41 As
well, he expressed caution about the criteria of employee morale and
disruption of a collective agreement, noting that:
The concern for the impact on other employees ... is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the interference with the operation of the employer's business
would be undue. However, more than minor inconvenience must be shown before the
complainant's right to accommodation can be defeated. The employer must establish
that actual interference with the rights of other employees, which is not trivial but
substantial, will result from the adoption of the accommodating measures. Minor
interference or inconvenience is the price to be paid for religious freedom in a
multicultural society.42
More importantly, Renaud also made clear for the first time that
trade unions, as well as employers, were bound by the duty to
accommodate, and that a collective agreement could not automatically
40 See, for example, D. Baker, "Alberta Human Rights Commission v. Central Alberta Daiy
Pool" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 1450; B. Etherington, "CentralAlberta Dairy Pool: The Supreme Court
of Canada's Latest Word on the Duty to Accommodate" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. L.J. 311; and A.M.
Molloy, "Disability and the Duty to Accommodate" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. L.J. 23 at 36-37. The
Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 6, makes the duty to accommodate an element in both
direct (s. 24(2)) and indirect (ss. 11(2) and 17(2)) discrimination cases.
41 Renaud, supra note 7 at 982. Sopinka J. also noted, at 984, that the terms "reasonable
measures" and "short of undue hardship" were "alternate ways of expressing the same content" (a
position opposed by some human rights advocates who fear that the first phrase is a weaker
standard than the second).
42 IbidL [emphasis added]. The Court elaborated on the duty in Commission scolaire regionale
de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525, where it upheld an arbitration award that required a
school board to pay Jewish teachers for religious holidays on the basis that to do so would not
constitute undue hardship. The factors affecting the duty are discussed at 545-46.
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stand in the way of a necessary accommodation. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the scope of the union's duty would vary depending on the way
in which it became a party to discrimination. On the one hand, a union
could be a direct party if it participated in the formulation of a
workplace rule that had an adverse impact on a protected group. For
example, it would be directly responsible if discrimination resulted from
a collective agreement provision, whether or not the clause had come
from the union's or the employer's agenda.4 On the other hand, the
union could become bound by a duty to accommodate even if
discrimination resulted from employer action alone, if the union's
cooperation became necessary at some point to facilitate the employer's
reasonable efforts to accommodate.44
In cases of "co-discrimination," the union would have an
immediate duty to accommodate, although the employer might
reasonably be expected to initiate proposals for accommodation. In
deciding appropriate action, the employer is expected to canvass
methods of accommodation that do not disrupt the collective agreement,
but the Court refused to hold that the employer must try all methods
outside the collective agreement before consulting the union.45 By
contrast, where the union is not a co-discriminator, the union is not
involved unless "no other reasonable alternative resolution of the matter
has been found or could reasonably have been found."46
The Court was sensitive to the fact that the union has different
concerns and functions than the employer in determining whether an
accommodation is reasonable, since it is a political institution, obliged to
represent and reconcile the interests of a number of employees, who
often have different needs and aspirations. According to Sopinka J., this
role should be taken into account in determining the scope of the
union's duty to accommodate:
43 Renaud, supra note 7 at 991. The Court rejected the dissenting reasons of Campbell J. in
Opau, Local 267 v. Domtar Inc. (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 65 at 74 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Gohm], which
had suggested that the union should not be liable for discrimination when the employer fired an
employee who could not work Saturdays for religious reasons. Gohm is discussed further infra note
63.
44 Renaud, supra note 7 at 989-90.
45 In the words of Sopinka J., ibia at 992, "[tlhe employer must take steps that are reasonable.
If the proposed measure is one that is least expensive or disruptive to the employer but disruptive of
the collective agreement or otherwise affects the rights of other employees, then this will usually
result in a finding that the employer failed to take reasonable measures to accommodate and the
union did not act unreasonably in refusing to consent."
46 1bid at 993.
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The primary concern with respect to the impact of accommodating measures is not, as in
the case of the employer, the expense to or disruption of the business of the union but
rather the effect on other employees. The duty to accommodate should not substitute
discrimination against other employees for the discrimination suffered by the
complainant. Any significant interference with the rights of others will ordinarily justify the
union in refusing to consent to a measure which would have this effect 4 7
Thus, it is legitimate for unions to be mindful of the impact of possible
accommodation on the accrued contractual rights of other members of
the bargaining unit and, when there is serious interference with those
rights, the union can refuse to waive the collective agreement.48
It is far from clear how these principles will play out in many fact
situations, since the cases frequently mention that the duty to
accommodate is context driven. In this case, a dispute had arisen
because the complainant, a Seventh Day Adventist, could not work his
regular Friday evening shift as a school custodian clue to the religious
requirement that he not work between sundown Friday and sundown
Saturday. Under the collective agreement, shifts were normally
scheduled from Monday to Friday, with only four employees working on
weekends. The employer offered to substitute a Sunday to Thursday
shift, provided that another employee could be found to work the Friday
evening, since Renaud's school was rented out to a community group at
that time. This proposal was rejected by the union. Other options, such
as moving to a job with straight days, were unavailable because the
complainant did not have enough seniority to bid for these hours
(regarded as more attractive by many in the bargaining unit).
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the determination of a
member-designate of the British Columbia Human Rights Council that
both the employer and the union had violated the duty to accommodate.
The Court was especially insistent that the union and employer should
have sought a volunteer to work out the accommodation, stating that the
union had failed to discharge the onus of proving that there would be
undue hardship in the accommodation proposed, since no volunteer had
been sought
The Court went on to comment that the member-designate's
decision that the shift change was the most reasonable accommodation
4 7 Renaud, supra note 7 at 991-92 [emphasis added].
48 Earlier he had stated, /i.L at 987, that "[w]hile the provisions of a collective agreement
cannot absolve the parties from the duty to accommodate, the effect of the agreement is relevant in
assessing the degree of hardship occasioned by interference with the terms thereof. Substantial
departure from the normal operation of the conditions and terms of employment in the collective
agreement may constitute undue interference in the operation of the employer's business."
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was supported by the evidence. 49 Implicit within that determination
must be a finding that another employee could be required to trade
shifts if no one volunteered. But if the shift change was the most
reasonable accommodation and another employee could be
compulsorily transferred, it is likely that the latter would be removed
from a position for which he or she had bid on the basis of seniority and
personal preference, which seems to be an interference with contractual
rights. 50 One can only infer that the proposed rearrangement would not
be seen as a significant interference with another employee's rights.
Before turning to the implication for seniority rights in other
situations, it is worthwhile to expand on the concept of discrimination
developing in the Supreme Court's decisions and reactions to it. A close
reading of the cases shows that they are still within the liberal tradition
that emphasizes equality of opportunity for individuals, rather than
equality of results for groups-if by that term we mean the right to a
degree of representation. A regular theme throughout the cases is the
importance of removing unfair and unnecessary barriers to allow
individuals access to the workplace to demonstrate their capacities, and
there is a clear sense of the salience of certain characteristics, such as
disability, sex or minority status, to one's participation in employment
and other institutions.51
While the jurisprudence is attentive to social context and to the
outcomes of various institutional practices, the resulting workplace
restructuring will not lead to the elimination of all practices which
adversely affect protected groups. With respect to both the BFOQ
defence and the duty to accommodate, the Court accepts that there are
costs associated with many accommodations, as well as competing
interests, which can legitimately be taken into account in determining
49 IbiL at 988-89.
50 The factum of the respondent cuPE local in Renaud, supra note 7, states that all vacancies
were posted under the collective agreement and open to bids by employees on the basis of seniority.
Therefore, to require another employee to switch shifts would be a violation of that employee's
collective agreement rights. The decision of the member-designate noted that trading the Friday
shift for a Sunday shift would involve another employee with greater seniority: see Renaud v. School
District No. 23 (Central Okanagan) (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D1/4255 at 4256 (B.C.).
51 This is seen both in passages in O'Malley, supra note 28, and in the Charter equality decision
of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 174-75, where McIntyre J.
speaks of treatment on the basis of one's merits and capacities as non-discriminatory. He also
states, at 165, that "the admittedly unattainable ideal should be that a law expressed to bind all
should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a more burdensome or less beneficial
impact on one than another" [emphasis added].
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whether anti-discrimination law has been infringed. 2 Most importantly,
merit continues to be a relevant consideration in the allocation of
benefits such as jobs, as is most clearly demonstrated by the BFOQ
defence.53
Similarly, judicial decisions acknowledge the reality of limited
resources and, therefore, the relevance of cost and efficiency in
accommodating difference, whether in the workplace or in society at
large. The Ontario Human Rights Commission has suggested that the
cost defence should be narrowly tailored so as to permit only "financial
costs" that are undue because they are "so substantial that they would
alter the essential nature of the enterprise" or "so significant that they
would substantially affect the viability of the enterprise. '5 4 However,
these guidelines seem much more stringent than the standard adopted
by the Supreme Court of Canada, which stresses that attempts at
accommodation must be "reasonable."5 5
The Court has also acknowledged the competing interests of
other groups to be deserving of some consideration. Where a proposed
52 Note that Ontario's Employment Equity Act, supra note 4, s. 29(2)(b), recognized the duty to
accommodate as a relevant consideration and also included a defence of reasonable efforts.
53 Human rights codes also explicitly recognize the ongoing relevance of merit: see, for
example, Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 6, s. 17, which requires that an individual with a
disability be able to perform the "essential duties" of a job (albeit after efforts to accommodate).
Overall, the law does not seem to have reached the position described by Kelman, supra note 17 at
1161 and 1186, as "distributive discrimination" whereby characteristics affecting productivity are
ignored for certain groups in the interest of participation.
54 The Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 6, s. 11(2), states that a requirement,
qualification, or factor is not reasonable and bona fide, and therefore not a defence to a complaint
of constructive discrimination, if the needs of the group members cannot be accommodated without
undue hardship "considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety
requirements, if any." For an interpretation, see Ontario Human Rights Commission, "Guidelines
for Assessing Accommodation Requirements for Persons with Disabilities Under the Ontario
Hunan Rights Code, 1981, as Amended" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. L.J. 186 at 193-97 [hereinafter Ontario
Commission Guidelines]. These guidelines are not binding on adjudicators or the courts, although
they are persuasive.
55 In Saskatoon Firefighters, supra note 13 at 1311, the Court interpreted Saskatchewan's
regulations defining the bonafide occupational requirement as one rendering it "necessary" to treat
members of a group in a certain way in order that the "essence of the business" is not undermined
as importing a standard of reasonableness with respect to "necessity." Again, in Zurich Insurance
Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321, Sopinka J. for the majority stated
that the board of inquiry erred in asking whether the very essence of the business would be
undermined if it could not use the discriminatory practice (in that case, car insurance premiums
rated on the basis of sex, age, and marital status). That standard was said to be higher than the one
required by the defence in s. 21 (now s. 22) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 6, or that
used in employment cases. At 350, he noted, "[a]n alternative may be impractical even though its
adoption would not undermine the very essence of a business."
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accommodation would create real health and safety risks for co-workers
or the public, the law does not require such action. But Renaud goes
beyond harm to speak of the need to protect other workers from
significant interference with their "rights." Immediately, the question
arises whether it is fair to talk of "rights" in this context. Does the term
unfairly tip the balance in an argument about accommodation,
suggesting that other employees' "interests" in preserving the status quo
are equivalent in weight to equality seekers' statutory or constitutional
"rights?"5 6 Or is it legitimate to be solicitous of others' contractual
rights-or even some of their interests and preferences-in determining
the scope of another individual's equality rights?
Again, the answer as to whether the Supreme Court's
terminology is appropriate depends on the applicable theory of equality.
In many cases, exempting the complainant from a rule or changing a
practice to accommodate creates an impact on others. In a case as
simple as O'Malley, an individual's exemption from a Saturday shift
requires another employee to fill in. Since cost has been accepted as a
consideration in limiting accommodation by employers or in determining
whether a BFOQ exists, other employees' contractual rights should be a
relevant consideration as well. 5 7 Some accommodations, such as
restrictions on an employee's seniority rights, carry quantifiable
costs-for example, in the lost wages and benefits that would occur by
preferring more junior members of designated groups over more senior
employees from another group in a layoff or promotion situation.
More controversial are "costs" for other employees which are
less tangible, but nevertheless significant to them. While the member of
a religious minority may have cogent reasons for seeking Saturday as a
day off work, other employees, too, may have good reasons for wanting
that day free-most obviously, a chance to spend it with family.58 The
Ontario Human Rights Commission seems to dismiss these simply as
56 Often the person posing this question reflects the view in human rights jurisprudence that
third-party "preferences" do not count as a defence to discrimination: see, for example, Ontario
Commission Guidelines, supra note 54 at 192.
57Ibid at 192-97. The focus is on the financial costs to the enterprise or employer, expressly
rejecting the argument that "third-party preferences" or the terms of a collective agreement can be
bars to providing the kind of accommodation sought by a complainant. The wording of the Ontario
Human Rights Code, supra note 6 (described supra note 54) is awkward with regard to
accommodation because it appears not to have contemplated the full range of actors who might be
asked to accommodate-most obviously, unions and co-workers, as well as employers.
Nevertheless, the words do leave room to consider the range of factors in Renaud, supra note 7.
58 In R. v. Edwards Books &Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 769-70, a Charter case dealing with
freedom of religion, Dickson CJ. endorsed the importance of a pause day to allow time with family.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
"third party preferences," a term traditionally used in relation to the
desire of individuals not to associate with members of particular groups.
But fairness requires that these effects be considered in some cases, for
in the fact situations described, it is not just the employer or the abstract
"enterprise" being asked to accommodate, but the other employees
whose contractual rights and expectations are detrimentally affected.59
Underlying the criticism of the rights terminology in Renaud is a
different concept of equality than that espoused by the courts-one that
sees the interests of the disadvantaged groups as trumping those
regarded as more advantaged. But while the courts are sympathetic to
issues of relative advantage and disadvantage, 60 they have not indicated
that the perspective of the disadvantaged group is the only relevant one.
Their concern is to facilitate access and participation for all groups in
the workplace-but only to the extent that it is possible to do so in light
of others' valid interests. While it is important to be vigilant lest a
presumption operate in favour of the status quo,61 the case can also be
made that arguments about advantage and disadvantage require greater
sensitivity, since the groups under discussion are large and composed of
members with a wide range of experiences and characteristics. While
commentators are often careful to acknowledge the diversity of
experience within the disadvantaged groups, especially along racial and
gender lines,62 they seem to ignore the complexity of the "more
advantaged" group when it comes to issues such as ethnicity and class.
Even if one accepts the general proposition that men have been more
advantaged than women, subsets of men have faced and continue to face
serious disadvantage because of class, educational background,
geographic location, and other factors not necessarily recognized by our
human rights codes. By considering the impact of accommodation on
other workers, the Supreme Court, in cases like Renaud, allows such
complexity to be considered.
59 In fact, third-party preferences are not always ignored in human rights jurisprudence: see,
for example, the acceptance of privacy concerns justifying sex as a BFOQ for personal care attendants
in Re School District No. 42 and cupE, Local 703 (1993), 33 L.A.C. (4th) 63 (Munroe); and for
guards in an RCMP lockup in Stanley v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/3799
(C.H.R.T.).
6 0 See, for example, the decision rejecting a Charter challenge to searches of male prisoners by
female guards in Conway v.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
61 This is Crenshaw's fear, supra note 8 at 1349.
62 See, for example, Sheppard, supra note 8 at 9-19 and the expanding literature on
intersectionality, such as K. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics" [1989]
U. Chi. Legal F. 139.
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IV. UNIONS AND THE DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE
While critics argue that the equality rights of disadvantaged
groups are not adequately protected by the evolving jurisprudence,
others say the Court has gone too far in imposing liability on unions.
The thrust of the argument is that Renaud and its companion in the
Ontario Court of Appeal, Gohm, 63 improperly attribute joint
responsibility to management and unions for collective agreement terms.
For example, Lynk and Ellis argue that a union is improperly held liable
when it is the employer alone who has the choice of whether or not to
enforce the collective agreement provision.64 In their view, a union
should at least be protected from liability if it has made genuine efforts
to remove a discriminatory clause from the collective agreement.65
Union liability should arise, they argue, only if there is a "sufficient
nexus" between the union and the discriminatory action, and a union
should be able to invoke the defence that its actions were based on a
cogent industrial relations purpose.66 While this recommendation of an
"industrial relations purpose" bears some resemblance to the Supreme
Court's reasons in Renaud, the nexus criterion is not a concern of the
Court.
Brian Etherington, writing after the decision, *argues that
Sopinka J.'s "co-discrimination" approach is based on "the unrealistic
premise of equal responsibility and power on the part of unions to
formulate workplace policies and rules."'67 In his view, the employer
63 Supra note 43, wherein lab technicians were required to work one Saturday in four. Unable
to do so for religious reasons, the complainant offered to work Sundays. The union rejected her
offer unless she was paid a premium for Sunday work as required by the collective agreement. The
employer refused to pay the premium, and ultimately she was discharged, with both the union and
the employer held liable for their failure to accommodate.
6 4 M. Lynk & R. Ellis, "Unions and the Duty to Accommodate" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. LU. 238 at
265. Their view is adopted in the dissenting reasons of Campbell J. in Gohm, supra note 43 at 74.
65 Lynk & Ellis, supra note 64 at 268. While this might shield the union in some
circumstances, it does not, in fact, do so in cases like Gohm, supra note 43; and Renaud, supra note
7. In both cases, the dispute is at least in part about clauses that the union wanted to have enforced:
/a, premium pay for Sunday work in Gohm, and protection of seniority in Renaud.
66 Lynk & Ellis, supra note 64 at 281.
67 B. Etherington, "The Human Rights Responsibilities of Unions: Central Okanagan School
District No. 23 v. Renaud" (1994) 2 Can. Lab. L.J. 267 at 276. He also argues, at 279, that the
Court's guidelines for accommodation can be criticized as "furthering romantic illusions proposed
by liberal pluralists that collective bargaining has resulted in an equal partnership, or system of co-
determination between management and labour ...."
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should have to accommodate without disturbing the collective
agreement unless there is no reasonable alternative. 68
Should we be more solicitous of unions, as these commentators
suggest? They are right to point out that many collective agreement
terms result from management pressure-but others are there because
of union insistence, a fact that Etherington, at least, fails to
acknowledge. Certainly, in the case of seniority rights, it is the unions
who urge greater protection, while premium pay for Sunday work in
Gohm is not an item that management seeks. Similarly, a mandatory
retirement provision may be a management proposal, but it may win
union members' support if it is coupled with a pension plan. Rather
than try to sort out which clauses come from management and which
from the union, the courts have correctly taken the view that the
collective agreement is a bargain in which each side wins on some
clauses and loses on others (often in order to get something of higher
priority). Since it is extremely difficult after the fact to sort out
responsibility for different terms, Sopinka J. in Renaud refused to do so,
holding both employer and union responsible. 69 At the same time, he
recognized that the union may have traded things off to win certain
objectives such as wages for greater seniority, or an agreement to work
Sundays in return for premium pay. His answer was not to isolate the
collective agreement from change, but to encourage employers to look
first outside the collective agreement's terms when considering
accommodation.
To protect the collective agreement at all costs would undermine
important public policy considerations with respect to human rights. In
being held jointly liable with the employer in some cases, unions (and
their members) are encouraged-like other institutions in society-to
think about diversity and the perspective in our norms and institutions
discussed earlier. Indeed, in a case like Gohm, it is difficult to feel
sympathy for the union when it was held liable for refusing to waive
premium pay if Gohm worked on Sunday. The premium pay provision
was clearly negotiated to penalize the employer and to compensate the
employees if required to work Sundays. The unstated norm is that
Sunday is a special day, whether for religious or family reasons. While
this may be true for the majority in the bargaining unit, it was not true
for Gohm, for whom Saturday was a special day. There seems to be no
68Ibid. at 280.
69 It is still an open question whether a union could escape liability for a discriminatory term if
it could demonstrate a bargaining history of employer resistance to a less discriminatory provision.
See Lynk & Ellissupra note 64 at 267-69, discussing Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.
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principled reason here, other than a rigid insistence on the inviolability
of negotiated terms, why unions should escape the obligation imposed
on other institutions to consider the impact of a rule that was made for
the majority's benefit on a religious minority.70
Lynk and Ellis perceive a conflict between the collective rights
focus of labour law and the individual rights focus of human rights law. 71
While it is true that collective bargaining operates on principles of
majority rule and exclusivity of representation for the union in
bargaining, it is incorrect to portray this as incompatible with the
equality objectives of human rights laws. Many unions are committed to
the pursuit of social justice, including greater workplace equality, as the
following section illustrates. For some unions, the protection of
minorities and women is an important objective, even when these groups
form only a small part of the bargaining unit.
On the other hand, human rights laws are not incompatible with
collective bargaining. True, they are directed toward attaining greater
justice for individuals in protected groups, but this check on the will of
the majority in the unionized workplace is no different from that
imposed on the majority in society at large. Invidious discrimination is
forbidden, as is adverse-effects discrimination that can be avoided
without undue hardship to others, in pursuit of fairness to disadvantaged
groups. This hardly amounts to the pursuit of individual rights above all.
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EQUALITY
Collective bargaining is a valued institution for a number of
reasons. Most obviously, by providing a greater measure of bargaining
power with an employer, it gives workers an opportunity to obtain more
favourable terms and conditions of employment than individuals acting
alone in most labour markets could hope to attain. The benefit lies not
only in the outcomes, but also in a process that gives workers an
70 A union official also suggested that Gohm could be exempted from Saturday work: see
Gohm, supra note 43 at 70; and Gohm v. Domlar Inc. (1990), 90 C.L.L.C. 17,027 at 16,289 (Ont.
H.R.C.). It seems strange that this is the union position, for this appears to be a greater imposition
on other employees' free time than allowing the complainant to work on Sundays at straight time.
Inevitably, many accommodation cases can be perceived by others as a form of special treatment for
the minority. Letting Gohm work Sundays at straight time seems the best way to avoid that charge.
71 Supra note 64 at 240 and 270. The Supreme Court discusses the relationship between
human rights laws, collective bargaining, and the reconciliation of competing employee interests in a
bargaining unit when upholding a mandatory retirement scheme in Dickason v. University ofAlberta,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103 at 1130-33.
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opportunity to participate in workplace governance. Moreover,
collective bargaining offers the protection of the "rule of law" in the
workplace, since management discretion is circumscribed by rules in the
collective agreement and a dispute resolution process-namely, the
grievance procedure and arbitration. 72
All of these objectives are ones that equality-seekers themselves
value,73 yet there are many critiques of collective bargaining as a device
for achieving equality. Gillian Lester, for example, argues that the
adversarial nature of collective bargaining is incompatible with the moral
world view that some feminists ascribe to women, while its political
structure often inhibits women's participation.7 4 Her pessimism seems
confirmed by Kumar and Acri in a study of the bargaining record of
various Ontario unions on issues related to gender equality. They found
variations across unions, plus a very limited degree of success in
bargaining on matters such as affirmative action programmes or sexual
harassment clauses.75 Moreover, in considering the efficacy of collective
bargaining, one cannot ignore the limits of union coverage, with
approximately 34.9 per cent of the workforce unionized in 1992, and
with 31.2 per cent of women organized compared to 38.1 per cent of
men. Nevertheless, women constituted approximately 41.3 per cent of
union members.76
Finally, the democratic nature of the collective bargaining
process can sometimes be perceived as a detriment to those concerned
about equality issues.77 Membership support is necessary to union
72 The argument for collective bargaining is made in P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New
Directions in Canadian LabourLaw (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 26-33.
73 See, for example, R. Leah, "Linking the Struggles: Racism, Feminism and the Union
Movement" (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Reprint Series No. 93,
1990). While taking a positive view of what collective bargaining can achieve, especially for women
of colour, she also notes where further changes would be beneficial.
74 G. Lester, "Toward the Feminization of Collective Bargaining Law" (1991) 36 McGill L.J.
1181.
75 P. Kumar & L. Acri, "Unions' Collective Bargaining Agenda on Women's Issues: The
Ontario Experience" (1992) 47 Rel. Ind. 623. Table 2, at 644, shows that very few of the agreements
surveyed in Ontario contained clauses on sexual harassment, childcare, extended parental leave,
affirmative action programmes, and special protections related to the use of video-display terminals.
76 Statistics Canada, Annual Report of the Minister of Industy, Science and Technology under
the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act, Part Il-Labour Unions, 1992 (Cat. 71-202,
November 1994) at 14, 15, and 20 [hereinafter CAuR.A]. The forecast for 1993 was continued
growth of female membership despite declining employment, which was attributed, at 14, to the
greater degree of job security in unionized jobs.
77 Lynk & Ellis, supra note 64 at 240.
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leaders seeking election, while the negotiation of collective agreements
requires leaders to canvass and pursue members' priorities thoroughly in
order to find backing for a strike or ratification of a new agreement. The
result may be the trade-off of terms that benefit only a minority of
workers during negotiations. This might lead to the sacrifice of
increased pensions in a unit with a large number of younger workers who
prefer higher current wages, or of a paid maternity leave plan, or of
super-seniority for under-represented groups.
If one takes the position that collective bargaining is antithetical
to the interests of equality seekers, then further discussion must focus on
the fundamental reform of labour relations. But even Lester, who seems
most critical of collective bargaining, does not go this far 7 8 More
importantly, her argument that collective bargaining is incompatible with
women's needs and desires is open to serious question, for this
conclusion rests on a very limited sample of case studies and ignores the
degree to which women have embraced collective bargaining in its
traditional form.7 9 Indeed, the major areas of growth in union
membership in the last two decades have been in predominantly female
sectors, especially public administration, health, and teaching,
8 0
Therefore, it is probably more realistic and fruitful to consider
what collective bargaining can do for equality and where its limits lie,
rather than to reject it completely.81 In this vein, it is necessary to put
the Kumar and Acri study in perspective. While unions apparently have
not had great success in negotiating about the kinds of women's issues
identified by the authors, it is important to note the narrow definition of
78 Lester, supra note 74 at 1212-18, suggests some modest changes to workplace operations
and ways to facilitate union organization.
79 Lester, ibid., looks at a garment workers' local, a Swedish workplace, and Yale University
clerical staff. It is surprising that there is no systematic effort to study major women's unions in
Canada, such as the Ontario Nurses Association or the Federation of Women Teachers
Associations, or some of the large public sector unions such as the Canadian Union of Public
Employees. For a contrasting view on the efficacy of unions, see Leah, supra note 73; and Nash &
Gottheil, supra note 2.
80 See, for example, S. Eaton, Women Workers, Unions and Industrial Sectors in North America
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1992, IDP Women/WP 1); and A. Forrest, "Women
and Industrial Relations Theory: No Room in the Discourse" (1993) 48 Rel. Ind. 409 at 414. For a
description of the same trends in the United States, see R. Spalter-Roth, H. Hartmann & N.
Collins, "What Do Unions Do for Women?" in S. Friedman et al., eds., Restoring the Promise of
American LaborLaw (Ithaca: ILR, 1994) 193 at 194.
81 See, for example, J. White, Women and Unions (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, 1980), c. 4. White concludes that women benefit from unionization, although the
benefit varies with the union and the employer. See also . White, Sisters and Solidarity: Women and
Unions in Canada (Toronto: Thompson, 1993), c. 3.
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"women's issues" employed in their survey. For many women, clauses
on paid maternity leave or special leave might be attractive, but other
terms may be a greater priority. Often, the most important benefit of
collective bargaining is its impact on wages, for example, the reduced
wage gap between men and women,82 the premium that comes from
working in unionized workplaces, 83 and the premiums that may be
negotiated for shiftwork.84
A second reason for caution in interpreting quantitative data is
the fact that unions may choose not to bargain for "equality clauses"
where the rules are already part of workplace law due to legislative
action. This is certainly one reason for the dearth of sexual harassment
clauses or maternity leave provisions incorporated through collective
bargaining, since both of these are regulated by statute.85
Because there is no empirical study related to race or disability
equivalent to that of Kumar and Acri, it is more difficult to determine
the frequency with which the unions pursue equality issues of interest to
them. Again, there is some evidence that unions act in the interests of
these groups. Non-discrimination clauses, often containing a list of
prohibited grounds, are found in many collective agreements. A reading
of the Labour Arbitration Cases shows that a number of collective
agreements contain provisions for alternative work for injured workers,
although these are usually subject to availability and ability to do the
job.8 6 But on a less positive note, collective agreements have also
worked against the interests of those with disabilities through provisions
for automatic termination following prolonged absence from work.
These have been increasingly vulnerable under human rights legislation
as a form of adverse-effects discrimination on the basis of disability.87
82 R.B. Freeman & LL Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books) at 17 and 20.
This pattern results partly because unions seek to have earnings less dispersed over the range of jobs
and equal pay for workers in the same job.
83 Weiler, supra note 72 at 27, observes that this seems to be approximately 10 to 15 per cent.
84 For example, the Ontario Nurses Association placed a high priority in negotiations through
the 1980s on obtaining shift premiums for hospital nurses.
85 In addition, a number of equality initiatives may be found outside the formal collective
agreement. Sexual harassment procedures are a common example.
86 See, for example, the clause examined in Canada Post, supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
87 See, for example, Re Glengany IndustieslChromalox Components and uSWA, Local 6976
(1989), 3 L.A.C. (4th) 326 (Hinnegan); and ONA v. Etobicoke Gen. Hosp. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 40
(Div. Ct.).
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Beyond the actual benefits that can be obtained through
collective bargaining, other advantages of unionization cannot be
captured by any survey of collective agreement terms. Freeman and
Medoff's study of American unions demonstrated a greater degree of
job security and tenure in unionized firms, which is important to
vulnerable groups.88 Moreover, unionized workers concerned with
equality rights can also turn to the arbitration process to provide a
significant supplement to human rights commissions in enforcing non-
discrimination norms, both bargained and statutory.8 9 This can be an
important benefit, in light of the lengthy delays in processing complaints
through human rights commissions.9
Thus, the picture of collective bargaining and equality is much
more nuanced than critics of collective bargaining have generally
acknowledged. It has its dark sides, but its brighter ones as well,
depending on one's perspective, the union under study, and the time-
frame chosen for examination.91 Some unions, such as the Canadian
Auto Workers in their negotiations with the large auto manufacturers,
have been leaders in bargaining equality issues.92 Others have been
88 See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 82 at 21; and CALURA, supra note 76.
89 This occurs through "just cause" clauses in discipline cases, non-discrimination clauses, and
concepts of illegality that allow arbitrators to consider human rights laws. More recently, some
jurisdictions specifically allow arbitrators to apply human rights and other employment laws. See
Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82, s. 89(g); Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Schedule
A, s. 48(12)0) [hereinafter OLRA]; and Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475, s. 43(1)(e).
90 For a review of some of the administrative problems of the Ontario Human Rights
Commission, see Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force, Achieving Equality:A Report on
Human Rights Reform (Toronto: Ministry of Citizenship, Policy Services Branch, 1992)
(Commissioner: M. Cornish) [hereinafter Cornish Report].
91 Note that even the dispute settlement mechanism by which collective agreement terms are
reached can be important. For example, some unions have been particularly successful in obtaining
"equality" clauses through interest arbitration, a process where there is "reasoned" argument to the
arbitration board, rather than a demonstration of force through a threatened strike. A good
example of union success in this forum is the contract language on health and safety protection for
video-display terminal operators and on sexual harassment, obtained by the Ontario Public Service
Employees Union in an interest arbitration with the Ontario government. For more detail, see K.
Swinton, "Collective Bargaining and the Promotion of Equality: The Canadian Experience"
(Report to the International Labour Office, Geneva, 1993) [unpublished].
92 For a description of the CAW and Chrysler 1993 agreement, see "Clauses Addressing the
Duty to Accommodate" (1992) 16 Lancaster L.L. Rep., 3. Contract Clauses, no. 3, 1 at 2
[hereinafter "Clauses"]. This agreement included provisions on a right to refuse work in the face of
serious harassment, a communications programme for members of a new anti-harassment policy,
training for local leadership on harassment and employment equity, and an increase in the payment
to the union childcare fund.
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slower to act, but the changing demography of the workplace has caused
many unions to embark on new equality initiatives.93
In judging unions, one cannot ignore the dynamic nature of
collective bargaining: unions are institutions that reflect not only their
members' hopes, fears, and beliefs, but also those of the broader society.
Thus, just as Canadian society is slowly becoming aware of its racial and
ethnic diversity, the needs of people with disabilities, and the importance
of women's perspectives in the workplace and in politics, so too is the
union movement similarly reflecting increasing awareness of these
issues. Affirmative action programmes to attract more women and
racial minorities into leadership positions were implemented at the
federation and union level in the 1980s, education programmes have
been undertaken for leaders and members, and bargaining agendas are
changing.94
Therefore, collective bargaining is an important institution in the
pursuit of equality-but like any democratic political institution,95
unions tend to reflect the interests of the middle, allowing them
sometimes to lose sight of, or sacrifice, the interests of the minority.
Collective bargaining legislation has recognized the potential for
harmful action by two sorts of measures. First, most labour legislation in
Canada contains a duty of fair representation that prevents a union from
acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in the representation
of members of the bargaining unit.96 Second, certification can be denied
to unions that discriminate on prohibited grounds, while contract terms
that violate human rights laws are deemed illegal.97
To date, these provisions have had a limited effect on the pursuit
of equality. Their main impact has been to restrict direct discrimination
93 See V. Galt, "Steelworkers Combat Attacks on Women" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (28
May 1992) A2; and White, supra note 81 (1993), c. 5.
94 M.C. Boehm, Who Makes the Decisions? Women's Participation in Canadian Unions
(Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Research Essay Series No. 35, 1991).
95 Weiler, supra note 72 at 33, states: "There are few institutions as democratic as the typical
Canadian union, as accountable to their constituents...."
96 See, for example, OLRA, supra note 89, s. 74. Some jurisdictions only impose the duty of fair
representation with respect to contract administration, but not negotiation: see, for example, the
federal, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland legislation. For detailed discussion
of the duty, see G.W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1994), c.
13. For an example of application of the duty to prevent sex and age discrimination, see Re
Cameron and Teamsters Local 213, [1982] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 215 (B.C.).
97 oL, supra note 89, s. 15 (union not to be certified if it discriminates on grounds prohibited
by Ontario Human Rights Code, supra note 6, or Charter, supra note 10), and s. 54 (collective
agreement must not discriminate in contravention of Human Rights Code or Charter).
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on prohibited grounds by unions, when that action was motivated by
animosity towards a protected group.98 The number of successful
complaints has been small, largely because labour relations boards, in
overseeing union activity, allow a wide margin within which unions seek
to balance the competing interests of members.99 Not surprisingly, then,
these sections have not been effective in addressing the richer concept of
equality captured in the legal recognition of adverse-effects
discrimination described earlier. For that, we need to turn to human
rights legislation and the duty to accommodate. When we do so, no
issue is more controversial than the fate of seniority systems.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENIORITY
In order to understand the strong feelings of organized workers
about the importance of safeguarding seniority rights, it is useful to
consider both of the ways in which seniority affects employment
practices and the major justifications for its inclusion in collective
agreements.
Seniority is of two types: benefits seniority provides greater
advantages in accordance with length of service-for example, longer
vacations or progress through the increments of a wage grid-while
competitive seniority, as its name implies, gives employees an advantage
over others as service accumulates. Thus, seniority may affect decisions
such as layoff, promotion, transfer, and access to preferred schedules
and vacation times, giving the more senior employee an edge over the
more junior. In some circumstances, for example, in the choice of shifts,
seniority will be the governing factor; in other circumstances, there may
be considerations in addition to seniority. For example, promotion may
be accorded to the most senior employee, if qualified for the job, or it
may be awarded to the more senior employee if two or more employees
are "relatively equal" in their qualifications, thus acting as a tiebreaker;
or it may be one of several factors to consider. Similarly, on layoffs, the
more senior employee may retain employment or bump the more junior,
if qualified for the remaining position.
Seniority systems are the product of negotiation between
employers and unions and, as such, they vary from one collective
agreement to another. Seniority may accumulate and have an impact in
98 Adams, supra note 96 at 13-16.
99 This is especially true when contract negotiations are under scrutiny: ibid at 13-43. See also
Lynk & Ellis, supra note 64 at 255.
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a number of ways: it may be earned by service anywhere with the
employer, only in one particular geographic location, in the bargaining
unit, or in a particular department or work unit, with the parties' choice
of system reflecting various concerns. An employer may prefer to have
seniority exercised on layoffs only within a department in order to
minimize the disruption from senior employees bumping more junior
employees, while a union may refuse to recognize the seniority of
employees transferring from another bargaining unit in the same
workplace in order to give greater protection to the interests of its
members. 100
Regardless of the type, seniority systems all rest on a number of
justifications. One major purpose is to further the rule of law in the
workplace as described earlier, by curbing employer discretion in
allocating benefits under the collective agreement-whether
promotions, preferred shifts, or vacation scheduling. Seniority, often
coupled with qualification requirements, provides a clear rule for
important decisions, thus preventing management from allocating
benefits and burdens on the basis of likes and dislikes. Therefore,
seniority can be an important safeguard against overt discrimination
toward minorities and women.1 01
For many, using seniority to govern decisions seems fairer than
other alternatives. While the result may seem to undermine
productivity-in that merit is not the sole basis of decision-champions
of seniority fear the potentially subjective and arbitrary nature of merit
determinations. Moreover, unlike decisions on the basis of group
representation or lottery, reliance on seniority is attractive since it seems
to offer everyone an ultimate chance at benefits; if they wait their turn,
all members can expect greater job security or better job conditions.
Employers also see benefits in the use of seniority to make
decisions. Since the system is easy to administer, grievances are likely to
be fewer than in a system where decisions are made on more subjective
or contentious bases.
There are also economic rationales for the protection of
seniority. A worker's seniority is considered an earned entitlement, part
100 See K. Swinton, "Restraints on Government Efforts to Promote Equality in Employment:
Labour Relations and Constitutional Considerations" in Abella Report, Research Studies, supra
note 25 at 273; and C. Summers & M. C. Love, "Work Sharing as an Alternative to Layoffs by
Seniority: Title VII Remedies in Recession" (1976) 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 893 at 899-906.
101 Nash & Gottheil, supra note 2, point this out using examples from the experience of
members of the CAW. See also Canadian Union of Public Employees, Equality in the Workl ace-An
AffirtativeAction Manual (Ottawa: curE Education Department, 1988) at 128.
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of the compensation package "purchased" through years of service.
According to a deferred-compensation theory of wages, an individual is
paid less than his or her productivity in earlier years in return for greater
benefits than actual productivity might warrant later °2 One form of
deferred compensation is the greater job security and benefits that come
with protection of seniority rights. As a result, both management and
labour gain; the employer retains workers by promising them greater
benefits with longer service, thereby reducing turnover and consequent
training and recruitment costs. In return, the employee has some
assurance of better conditions and greater job security as a result of
waiting his or her turn.103
It is true that seniority is not an inviolable property right.
Unions do bargain about seniority systems and change them, sometimes
giving greater seniority to union leaders or, more recently, waiving the
rules in the interests of equity objectivesP 4 But unions do so cautiously,
since seniority is highly valued in the unionized workplace.105
Yet while seniority is prized in the unionized-and, indeed, in
non-unionized settings-it clearly can create barriers to the workplace
participation of members of some groups protected by human rights
legislation, as the following two scenarios illustrate.
VII. ACCOMMODATION AND SENIORITY
The first scenario resembles the fact situation in Renaud:
106
constructive discrimination has occurred against a member of a
protected group, and the collective agreement seniority provisions seem
to be an obstacle to accommodation. Generally, these cases will involve
individuals who are already in the workplace, with the largest number
arising when workers are no longer able to do their jobs because of a
disability. If such workers could be accommodated in their existing
102 Fallon & Weiler, supra note 9 at 57 make much of this justification.
103 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 82 at 107, conclude that seniority rules are an important
factor explaining the lower labour turnover rate in unionized firms.
104 Language agreed upon by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and the Grain Workers Union
would provide for discussions on crediting target group members with the average seniority of those
in the bargaining unit. See "Clauses," supra note 92 at 5.
105 Weiler, supra note 72 at 130-32, discusses the protective attitude taken by the B.C. Labour
Relations Board, when he was Chair, in complaints of unfair representation when seniority rights
were detrimentally affected.
106 Supra note 7.
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positions, there would be no problem-and the clear message from
Renaud is that job adjustment should be the employer's first priority.
When job adjustment is impossible, workers may seek other positions
that they are capable of filling in the workplace. But what if the job
opening must be posted under the collective agreement, with selection
turning, at least in part, on seniority? For example, the agreement might
state that the most senior employee is entitled to the job if qualified, or
the more senior employee gets the position if two candidates are
relatively equal. Let us assume that the employee with the disability
does not have the necessary seniority for the placement. 07
An important initial question is whether the complainant/grievor
can claim another job as a form of accommodation when unable to fulfil
the requirements of his or her own.108 To date, the few cases dealing
with this issue have taken different approaches. In Emrick Plastics, a
pregnant employee successfully claimed the right to be transferred from
her work as a painter to an open job as a packer in order to remove a
risk to her unborn child.1 09 There was no discussion of the right to
another position when disabled from doing one's own job, and in this
case, the transfer was temporary. In Calco, the arbitrator held that the
employer should find another job for the grievor, a retail employee who
had a mental disability unknown to the employer or the employee at the
time of discharge.110 Again, no discussion occurred as to the basis for
holding that accommodation extended to the provision of another job.
In contrast, some commentators conclude that the right extends only to
107 Note that the fact situation could easily be adapted to deal with an employee whose
religious convictions prevented him or her from staying in a particular job-for example, because of
scheduling requirements, as in Renaud, ibd., or because of a safety hazard. An example of the latter
is a man, full-bearded because of his religion, who is prevented from working as a correctional
officer because the beard impairs the seal of a gas mask that would be necessary safety equipment
during any prison riot where tear-gas might be deployed. See Re Singh and Ontario (Correctional
Services) (1980), 27 L.A.C. (2d) 295 (Ont. G.S.B.).
108 Sometimes a collective agreement will provide some entitlement to such treatment, at
least on a temporary basis. See, for example, Canada Post, supra note 23; or the agreement in Re
Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality of) and cUP, Local 79 (1994), 46 L.A.C. (4th) 110 (Fisher).
1 0 9 Emrick Plastics v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 476 (Ont.
Div. Ct.). But see Brown v. MNR (1993), 93 C.L.L.C. 17,013 (C.H.R.T.), where it was held that an
employer has duty to accommodate woman's request for a transfer from rotating shifts to straight
days during pregnancy and after child born.
110 Re Calgary Co-operative Ass'n and Calco Club (1992), 24 L.A.C. (4th) 308 (McFetridge)
[hereinafter Calco]. The grievance succeeded on the ground, at 320, that the employer had
disciplined the grievor twice for the same incident, so technically the discussion of transfer was
obiter. In Re Union Carbide Canada Ltd. and Ecw, Local 593 (1991), 21 LA.C. (4th) 261 (Ontario)
(Hinnegan) [hereinafter Union Carbide], there was no discussion of the right of the disabled worker
to claim another job; the right was just assumed.
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adapting an individual's job and does not require access to another
position for which he or she is qualified.111
The view that there is no right to a different job' seems legally
correct in light of the language of human rights codes. For example,
section 11 of the Ontario Human Rights Code provides that an employer
must accommodate with respect to the job rule or practice which has
been identified as resulting in adverse-effects discrimination, while
section 17 stipulates that a person with a disability must be able to
perform the essential duties of the job which is to be filled.112 In fact,
the statutory right of reinstatement of a disabled worker found in
Ontario's Workers' Compensation Act specifically gives the disabled
employee the right to transfer to another job if the worker is unable to
return to his or her own, even after attempts at accommodation.113
For purposes of this discussion, however, let us assume that there
is a right to seek another job, which certainly seems like the humane
alternative to dismissal or layoff. And even if there is no such right,
seniority can still be an issue in accommodation when an individual seeks
a job similar to his or her own, as in Renaud, but with a different work
schedule, location, or mix of duties, if the collective agreement requires
posting of vacant positions. Does the disabled employee have a right to
claim that the seniority provisions of the collective agreement should be
ignored in this situation? Many would argue that they should: when
competing interests are balanced, the disabled employee will be facing
unemployment if denied the position, while the more senior employee is
merely asked to postpone temporarily the move to a more desirable
position.1 14 In some workplaces, this may mean a short delay, although
in others, the wait could be lengthy, depending on the size of the
III See M. Ginsburg & C. Bickley, "Accommodating the Disabled: Emerging Issues Under
Human Rights Legislation" (1993) 1 Can. Lab. LJ. 72 at 88-98; Re Royal Alexandra Hospital and
Alberta HEu, Local 41 (1992), 29 L.A.C. (4th) 58 (Power) (expressing doubt about the need to
provide another job for a hospital porter unable to do her own); and Canada Post, supra note 23. In
Renaud, supra note 7, a range of jobs was considered by the employer and complainant, although the
one decided upon was still a custodian's job.
112 Supra note 6. These sections reflect the constructive discrimination cases in the courts,
which focus on the impact of a particular practice, as in cA., supra note 30.
113 Supra note 3, s. 54.
114 Union Carbide, supra note 110 at 265, takes this position, holding that the seniority
provisions of the collective agreement could not block a more junior, but injured, worker from
claiming a job for which he was qualified. This case was decided before Renaud and has no
discussion of the concerns in that case about the rights of other workers.
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operation and the degree of turnover.115 The response of the law will be
discussed after a description of the second scenario in which seniority is
a potential barrier to equality-seeking employees.
VIII. SENIORITY AS CONSTRUCTIVE DISCRIMINATION
In the above discussion, seniority is not the primary problem;
rather, another workplace rule or practice creates discrimination. In
other cases, however, the seniority system itself will come under attack
as a form of constructive discrimination-most obviously, when layoffs
for financial reasons are made according to seniority, and the more
junior employees are disproportionately female or members of a racial
minority group.116
Members of these groups may also face obstacles at the hiring
and promotion stages: women traditionally employed in white-collar jobs
may find that they do not have the seniority to bid for desirable openings
in a separate bargaining unit of blue-collar or manufacturing jobs, since
the collective agreement only allows hiring from outside the unit for
entry level positions.11 7 For people with some disabilities, the effect may
be that they can never enter a particular workplace because they cannot
meet the essential requirements of the entry level position, despite their
ability to do another job in the hierarchy.
An added complication might be faced by individuals-often
women-seeking a job in another unit. If seniority accrues only within
the new bargaining unit and their past service with the employer will not
be recognized, the loss of job security that comes with starting at the
115 j. White, in Mail and Female: Women and the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (Toronto:
Thompson, 1990) at 89-90, describes the importance of seniority, noting, "[i]n a small office, if
someone is one spot ahead of you on the seniority list it means an extra five or six years on midnight
shift, or it means another few years with no summer holidays."
116 See, for example, the descriptions of the fate of women at Stelco in C. Sheppard,
"Affirmative Action in Times of Recession: The Dilemma of Seniority-Based Layoffs" (1984) 42
U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; and M. Luxton & J. Corman, "Getting to Work: The Challenge of the 'Women
Back Into Stelco' Campaign" (1991) 28 Labour/Le Travail 149. See also Australian Iron & Steel Pty.
Ltd. v. Banovic (1989), 89 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.) [hereinafter Banovic]; and American cases like
Firefghters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Stotts].
117 See, for example, Ontario Women's Directorate, Equity at Work-Consumer's Gas Study
(Toronto: Ontario Women's Directorate, 1990), where the employer's equity initiative to move
women into a non-traditional job in its outside operations was opposed by the union because it gave
preference for a desirable job to women, who had less seniority in the bargaining unit. Under the
collective agreement, seniority in another unit was not recognized in job competitions, although
once an employee entered the outside unit, accrued seniority rights in other units were recognized.
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bottom of the seniority list creates a powerful disincentive against
moving1 18
In each of these examples, from the perspective of the members
of the group disadvantaged by the seniority system, a systemic form of
discrimination is being practised. The Ontario Human Rights
Commission filed a complaint on this issue in 1992 with respect to the
treatment of women members of a white-collar, or "inside" bargaining
unit with the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto organized by CTPE
Local 79. Their seniority was not being recognized for purposes of
bidding for jobs in the outside unit organized by Local 43 of cuPE, with
the result that temporary employees in the outside unit blocked the
women's access to the full-time jobs there. The human rights complaint
argued that it was a form of sex discrimination to refuse to recognize the
seniority of the women employees from the inside unit.119
The first issue in cases like this is to ask whether the seniority
system does constitute a form of constructive discrimination. At first
glance, the examples seem to show that the weight given to seniority
disadvantages certain groups. Certainly, in many bargaining units, those
with the greatest seniority will be white males for a variety of reasons:
there may have been past discrimination by employers against women or
minorities; hostile working environments, including harassment, may
cause minorities to leave or discourage them from applying; traditional
views about appropriate roles for women may have channelled them into
certain jobs, such as clerical work, and away from others; the
employment of many women will have been interrupted while they
raised children; and some racial minorities may have shorter workplace
attachment because they are recent immigrants.
Yet there is good reason to pause here and think about the
meaning of constructive discrimination with regard to seniority. While
seniority systems in some workplaces will favour men over women, or
whites over racial minorities, this will not be the case in other situations.
In female-dominated job classes, such as nursing or clerical work,
respect for seniority will not constitute discrimination against women. In
many bargaining units, the seniority list will have a racial and gender
118 See, for example, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) [hereinafter
Lorance].
119 J. Armstrong, "Seniority Barrier for Women To Be Tested" The Toronto Star (21 August
1992) A7. There has been no decision on this complaint at this time.
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mix. 120 Nor does disability automatically equate with shorter service
(despite that argument by human rights advocates), since a large number
of workers are disabled on the job or as a result of the normal aging
process.12 1 Therefore, despite the assertion that seniority excludes
disadvantaged groups in layoffs, promotions, and hiring, there is
counterfactual evidence in many workplaces to support the view that
seniority is not a form of adverse-effects discrimination. Indeed, in
providing protection against employer discretion, it may provide a
safeguard against subtle discrimination directed towards protected
groups.
Yet adherence to seniority for promotions, or during layoffs in
workplaces where women have been systematically excluded, ensures
that longer-service males continue to reap the benefits of past
discriminatory activity 12 2 Even here, however, there may be difficult
empirical questions as to when the effect of the seniority system
constitutes discrimination. Cases like Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.1 23
have just begun to explore the meaning of constructive discrimination in
Canada, and there is much to be learned. Brooks suggests that a
negative impact on a protected group must be significant, and that there
is both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect to the inquiry into
constructive discrimination, not just a numerical determination that one
group suffers a greater burden than another.
The Banovic case in the Australian High Court demonstrates the
complexity of the empirical inquiry 24 There, it was determined that a
layoff in accordance with seniority was a form of sex discrimination
under human rights legislation because of prior overt discrimination
against women that delayed their hiring. Dawson J., in concurring
reasons, thoughtfully discussed the importance of comparison methods
120 For the different bargaining unit makeup at Canada Post over time, see White, supra note
115. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 82 at 135, concluded that, in the United States, seniority does
not significantly disadvantage racial minorities in general, although that may be the case in
particular workplaces.
121 Baker & Sones, supra note 3 at 31, cite figures showing that 23 per cent of those with
disabilities in Ontario were injured at work or elsewhere.
122 Examples can be found in the fact situations of Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian
National Railway Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 [hereinafterAction Travail]; orLorance, supra note 118.
123 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 [hereinafter Brooks], holding that pregnancy discrimination is a form
of sex discrimination. One sees the qualitative element in the rejection of the argument that a "no
beards" rule could be seen as sex discrimination because of the adverse effect on men. See also the
discussion in Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 at 761-71, a Charter case about adverse-effects
analysis with respect to sex discrimination.
124 Supra note 116.
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in determining the impact of the layoff on men and women, ultimately
concluding that it would be improper to look simply at the impact of the
layoff on men and women within the aggregate workforce, since there is
bound to be a disparate impact unless the workforce starts out evenly
balanced. 125 Instead, the issue should be the proportion of men and
women in similar circumstances who can comply with the seniority
rule-here, those who applied for work around the same date.126 On the
facts, because of prior discrimination, women had less seniority because
of the delays in hiring them. The implication was that there would be no
problem with the seniority system absent prior discrimination, since men
and women in the same pool would have similar experiences in a layoff.
As seniority systems come under scrutiny by Canadian
adjudicators, similar difficult questions about the meaning of adverse-
effects discrimination will have to be confronted. Do we look at the
impact of seniority on those who applied around the same time? Or do
we focus on the proportion of women and minorities laid off, in contrast
to white males, and find discrimination if there is a significant difference
in compliance? The latter approach seems most consistent with
developing principles of equality in light of the barriers to participation
described earlier. After all, if a seniority rule, rather than some other
basis for decision-making, excludes women or racial minorities, it seems
to fall within the concept of adverse-effects discrimination and require
justification.
IX. IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
Let us assume that an adjudicator does conclude that there is
constructive discrimination in the uses of seniority described above. This
leads to the issue of justification: is it reasonable to rely on length of
service to allocate benefits and burdens; and is there a reasonable
method of accommodation to redress the disadvantage caused by its use
without, in turn, causing undue hardship?
In answer to the first question, courts and boards are unlikely to
accept that seniority is an unreasonable factor in layoffs or promotion
cases, given its long use, its utility as a way to circumscribe management
discretion, its importance to unionized workers, and its contractual
125 In fact, as the dissenting reasons of Brennan J., ibid. at 4, point out, the proportion of men
and women who retained employment despite the layoff was about the same: 94 per cent.
126 Ibid. at 15-19.
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basis.1 27 But is there any accommodation that can reduce the burden of
the seniority system without undue hardship-that is, without significant
interference with the rights of others?128 In the case of layoffs,
alternatives such as job-sharing are sometimes suggested, but this will
not be feasible when a major restructuring is occurring.1 29 Aside from
this, or early retirement incentives, accommodation would require some
modification of seniority rights. For example, one might consider
employer-wide seniority in a case like the Metro Toronto inside/outside
hiring described in Part VIII, above. Another possibility would be
special seniority provisions that allocate a form of extra or super-
seniority for target groups, while still another might be separate seniority
lists, with layoffs and promotions made according to a principle that
ensures some degree of ongoing representation of the target groups
throughout various classifications. 130
Renaud implies that unions and employers do not have to
encroach on the seniority system when to do so constitutes a serious
interference with the rights of other employees. Changing the weight
accorded to seniority in layoffs would impose real and quantifiable
127 T. Hervey, Justifications for Sex Discrimination in Employment (London: Butterworths,
1993) at 189-94, describes the general success of employers in preserving seniority systems in the
U.K., while the Abella Report, supra note 25 at 220 recommended a "presumption" in favour of
bonafide seniority systems.
128 American case law is of little assistance when thinking about these cases, since the Civil
Rights Act, Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), s. 703(h) (1989) exempts bona fide seniority systems
from a finding of disparate-impact discrimination. For cases examining this section, see Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); and Stotts, supra note 116.
129 This suggestion is found in Fallon & Weiler, supra note 9; Sheppard, supra note 116; and
Summers & Love, supra note 100 at 917ff.
130 See H. Jain, Anti-Discrimination Staffing Policies: Implications of Human Rights Legislation
for Employers and Trade Unions (Ottawa: Secretary of State, 1985) at 66-67. Jain recommends that
unions negotiate to have layoffs occur in proportion to the representation of racial groups and men
and women in the workplace, or on the basis of reverse seniority, with the most senior employee laid
off fast. Obviously, the impact on various groups of workers varies with the approach. Layoffs on
the basis of reverse seniority put the greatest burden on older workers, often but not necessarily
white males. Layoffs in proportion to workplace representation (e.g., if women are 20 per cent of
the workforce, they take a 20 per cent share of the layoffs) are less burdensome to the white male
group, but may not satisfy those who wish to make speedier progress towards representative
workplaces. That goal would be better achieved by laying off the target groups only if their level of
representation had reached that in the qualified labour pool or, more boldly, in the general
population. Thus, we are drawn inevitably into the kind of discussion, fundamental to employment
equity programmes, about appropriate levels of representation before we can decide how to
redesign seniority systems.
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financial costs on identifiable individuals.131 As Fallon and Weiler have
noted in the American context, seniority is an earned entitlement that
over the years becomes as important as a person's equity in his or her
home. To lay off a senior male ahead of a person from a racial minority
or a woman would be to deprive him unfairly of earned entitlements.132
Even with a promotion, where there is a less dramatic interference with
rights-since no one loses a job-there is still a cost in the loss of the
better position, even on a temporary basis.
Once again, it is important to note that the argument for super-
seniority or proportional seniority lists often rests on the goal of an
ongoing degree of group representation in the aftermath of layoffs or
promotions. This is founded on a theory of substantive equality based
on equality of results that goes beyond the evolving Canadian law
described above and ignores the burdens on others of the
accommodation sought. In advocating this result, some Canadians echo
views in the American literature, where the argument against seniority
and in favour of group representation ties into the affirmative action
debate. Traditionally, affirmative action in the United States has been
justified as a way to provide compensation for the ongoing effects of past
discrimination, especially against blacks.133 Layoff in accordance with
seniority has been a particular concern, since it can undercut the gains
achieved through affirmative action programmes.
But affirmative action based on a theory of compensation or
corrective justice is a controversial concept. Most particularly, it raises
concerns of intergenerational unfairness, when used to override
seniority. Often, those benefited are younger women or members of a
131 In Dragerv. LAMAw (1994), 20 C.H.R.R. D/119 (B.C.) [hereinafter Drager], the B.C. Human
Rights Council absolved the union from liability for adverse-effects discrimination against an
adherent of the Seventh Day Adventist religion resulting from shift scheduling. As in Renaud, supra
note 7, the complainant did not have enough seniority to bid for work that did not conflict with his
religion, but the union made various efforts to accommodate. The board of inquiry announced, at
D/134, that the seniority provisions of the collective agreement should not be touched, as
interference with another employee's seniority rights might well cause undue hardship to the union.
See also Ontario Allied Construction Trades Council v. Ontario Hydro (1993), 93 C.L.L.C. 16,066
(O.L.R.B.) (the Workers' Compensation Act, supra note 3, s. 54, does not create super-seniority); Re
Canada Post, supra note 23 at 324; Re Boise Cascade Canada Ltd. and us'i Local 1330 (1994), 41
LA.C. (4th) 291 at 299 (Palmer) [hereinafter Boise Cascade]; and Greater Niagara Gen. Hosp. and
SEiu Local 204 (25 April 1995) (Brent) [unreported].
132 Fallon & Weiler, supra note 9 at 57-58 and 67. I am assuming here that there has been no
prior discrimination in hiring by the employer that taints the seniority system.
133 See, for example, Fallon & Weiler, ibid., discussing models of individual, group, and social
justice; and Fiss, supra note 8. Fallon & Weiler defend preferential hiring for black applicants, but
they argue against sacrificing the seniority of individual white employees in layoffs to compensate
for past societal wrongs.
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racial minority, rather than the older members who actually faced
discrimination.1 34 Therefore, affirmative action seems to benefit the
minority group's members today for wrongs done to earlier generations,
and to impose the cost of compensation on the younger generation for
injury done by their parents.
Even if the argument can be made that there is some relative
advantage in one group over another, one cannot escape the very real
truth that preference for members of one group harms identifiable
members of another-and often in the context of layoffs and promotions
those individuals will not be particularly advantaged in society. A refusal
to recognize the seniority of an older white male, for example, might
privilege a younger woman or a recent immigrant from a racial minority
group at the expense of the older Portuguese or Italian worker, himself a
first-generation Canadian whose main asset is his employment.
But the American framework, and its approach to affirmative
action, is not automatically transferable to Canada. While many
Canadian jurisdictions have adopted employment equity policies, the
conceptual foundation for them is arguably different from that
underpinning American affirmative action. As with the law on adverse-
effects discrimination, the goal here is not to alter standards on a
temporary basis, because groups cannot otherwise meet job requirements
due to past discrimination. As in the United States, the ultimate goal is
integration of the target groups, but through providing a fairer
opportunity for them to compete in a modified workplace. The
emphasis is on the future and permanent transformation of the
workplace, whether by challenging preconceptions about the abilities of
targeted groups, or by making employers examine barriers to the access
of those groups and reducing or eliminating them if possible-for
example, by changing hiring practices or eliminating unnecessary job
requirements.13 5
134 As a result, the literature and United States Supreme Court cases make frequent reference
to the "victims" of reverse discrimination experiencing the burden for the "sins of their fathers."
See, for example, K. Sullivan, "Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases"
(1986) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78 at 84.
135 This seems to be the thrust of the federal and the repealed Ontario employment equity
legislation, supra note 4, although many would quarrel with my reading of the employment equity
legislation's goals. There is no doubt that these laws contain mixed signhls, since they speak of both
barrier removal and progress towards better representation of target groups through the
establishment of goals and timetables. However, various provisions in the Acts suggest to me that
the emphasis is still on a richer concept of equality of opportunity, rather than group representation
per se.
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Therefore, Canadian solicitude for group representation has
different roots than in the United States. Even where group
representation is stressed, the objective is to ensure greater access, as
illustrated by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Action Travail.
In upholding an affirmative action programme imposed on Canadian
National Railways (cN) that demanded a certain level of representation
of women in blue-collar jobs, Dickson C.J. emphasized the importance
of affirmative action as a remedy for systemic discrimination. A human
rights tribunal had upheld a complaint of sex discrimination against CN,
and the case focused on the legality of affirmative action as a remedy to
counter further discrimination. Dickson C.J. concluded that such a
remedy would undermine further efforts at direct discrimination and
would provide a critical mass of women who could work within the
institution for changes in systems and attitudes-for example, by
countering stereotypes and resisting sexual harassment.1 36 Thus, there is
a conceptual link between Action Travail and other cases dealing with
adverse-effects discrimination, since both types of cases are aimed at
providing equal opportunity for certain groups.
Returning to the issue of seniority and accommodation, we
might reformulate the argument for special seniority rules. Instead of
demanding representation to ensure equal results, we might justify
limited restraints on seniority rights, especially in layoff situations, in
order to maintain a critical mass of target group members. As in Action
Travail, this would be justified as promoting equal opportunity in the
future by undermining attempts at direct discrimination and changing
the practices that create systemic barriers.
But, even here, we cannot escape the fact that individual workers
with greater seniority would be denied an opportunity to continue
working or to bid for a promotion because of their gender or race.
These individuals would be required to bear the cost of promoting the
societal objective of employment equity, rather than having the burden
spread across the larger group. This seems to be the very kind of
"significant interference" with contractual rights that circumscribes the
duty to accommodate. This is most obvious in the layoff situation, but it
is also a factor in many promotions and transfers.
In sum, Renaud suggests that seniority systems will generally be
protected during layoffs and with respect to promotions, because any
accommodation required will significantly interfere with rights.
Nevertheless, there are three circumstances where changes to seniority
136 Action Travail, supra note 122 at 1143-45.
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systems may be required, despite a general acceptance of their
operation. The first two particularly affect those with disabilities.
First, if hiring is only at the entry level in positions that cannot be
filled by individuals with certain disabilities, use of seniority to fill
subsequent positions in the job hierarchy effectively prevents people
with disabilities from ever entering the workplace. For example, if the
progression to an office job in a factory first requires work lifting and
moving objects on a production line, those in wheelchairs are effectively
denied equality of opportunity by the seniority system. Modification of
the seniority rules to allow some specified positions above the entry level
to be filled by a broader search may well seem a reasonable
accommodation in certain types of workplace.13 7
This accommodation may also benefit existing workers who
require accommodation because of an injury, yet lack the seniority to bid
for it. However, these individuals will also want to press the more
ambitious argument that the use of seniority for transfers should
sometimes give way to allow injured workers to bid for any opening for
which they are qualified. Essentially, this is the argument from Renaud,
where it was raised in a religious context. Clearly, there is an
interference with the seniority rights of another worker, who must
postpone access to the desired position. But in larger workforces where
there is some degree of regular turnover, this interference may be
deemed not to be "significant" in some circumstances.138
Finally, we come to the situation described in Part VIII, above,
with respect to Metropolitan Toronto, where there are different
bargaining units, and seniority rights are not transferable between them.
From the perspective of those in the outside unit, this is a perfectlyjustifiable protection for members. Yet there are serious equity
13 7 It is difficult to see how a successful human rights complaint could be brought to challenge
these hiring practices, for the potential applicant will have difficulty identifying a particular position
to which he or she is entitled, let alone showing that he or she is the one who should have had thejob. Moreover, an adverse-effects discrimination case will not be easy, since the seniority system
will not block all with disabilities, but only those with certain disabilities and work histories. For this
reason, employment equity plans are a more useful mechanism for aiding such workers-provided
they can question the operation of the seniority system, as discussed below.
138 The interpretation inDrager, supra note 131, seems to differ, as does that in Boise Cascade,
supra note 131. The view in the text, however, is implicit in Re Better Beef LtL and IFCw, Region 18
(1994), 42 L.A.C. (4th) 244 at 256 (Welling) (duty to accommodate does not require the employer
to displace an incumbent worker, but it may prevail over seniority rights in a job competition). All
of these cases involve competition over jobs. In some cases, it may be necessary to interfere with
seniority rights in relation to benefits, where the stakes are not so high. For example, if the most
desirable locker location goes to the person with the greatest seniority, but is the only one accessible
to someone in a wheelchair, this seems an obvious case for seniority to give way.
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concerns if the seniority of the inside workers is not recognized,
particularly if one considers the degree to which sex discrimination has
affected the design of bargaining units in Canada. Often, the practice of
allocating clerical workers (primarily women) and blue-collar workers
(primarily men) to separate bargaining units reflects systemic
discrimination. The separate units reflect past attitudes of the union
movement about the relative willingness of men and women to organize
and bargain effectively, which dampened the interest of many unions in
organizing women.139 Moreover, labour relations board determinations
about the appropriate bargaining unit often rested on the assumption
that blue- and white-collar workers did not share a community of
interest. Thus, bargaining units often reflect certain stereotypes about
the needs and interests of groups of workers. 140  After all, the
overwhelming concentration of women in clerical jobs reflects a complex
set of societal factors, including not only employer expectations about
female roles but also recruitment methods that directed women to some
jobs and away from others, as well as channelling them away from
certain educational and training programmes.141 Employment equity
programmes seek to change those expectations and practices, but
seniority systems can stand in the way if existing service with the
employer is not recognized, both in the job bidding process and,
especially, in the move into the new unit.
Again, the first question in a human rights complaint will be
whether the application of seniority rights is discriminatory.
Undoubtedly, it will be argued that hiring workers at the entry level in
casual jobs and then allowing them to build up to full-time status does
not exclude women; rather, it requires them to enter the workforce in
the same way men do. But insistence that full-time jobs be the subject of
bidding based on bargaining-unit seniority does deny a realistic
opportunity to existing female employees to enter non-traditional jobs in
the other bargaining unit with their employer, and results in differential
treatment of men and women who entered the employer's service at the
139 For further discussion, see White, supra note 81; and A. Forrest, "Bargaining Units and
Bargaining Power" (1986) 41 Rel. Ind. 840.
140 The Ontario Labour Relations Board jurisprudence on bargaining units contained some
important assumptions about community of interest that led to separate bargaining units for full-
and part-time workers and blue- and white-collar workers, having a significant impact on women's
terms and conditions of employment. See R. Davis, The O.L.RB. Policy on Bargaining Units for
Part-Tune Workers:A Critique (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1991).
141 For an interesting discussion of hidden gender discrimination, see V. Schultz, "Telling
Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument" (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1749.
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same time. This compounds the effects of past systemic sex
discrimination, even if women as a group are not denied entry to the
bargaining unit.
Would it be a serious interference with rights under Renaud if
employer-wide seniority were recognized as a form of accommodation in
this situation? A strict reading of the case would lead to an affirmative
response, for the recognition of system-wide seniority does displace
some on the seniority list. But that argument ignores the fact that the
seniority rights of those in the outside unit were gained through
discrimination by employers and unions-and perhaps some of the
members themselves-who discouraged women from entering non-
traditional jobs. Recognizing employer-wide seniority places the
affected women from the inside unit in the position they would have
occupied in the absence of discrimination-and leaves the men where
they would have been, absent a history of systemic discrimination.142
Therefore, in this limited case, the seniority system should be
seen as a form of constructive discrimination requiring accommodation.
It is the kind of situation that begs attention in the bargaining process,
but it is unlikely to be dealt with adequately there, since there will be a
disincentive in many bargaining units to negotiate changes to the
seniority system that will disadvantage members. Those hurt by the
existing agreement. have no direct input into the design of the system,
and they must turn to the employer to press for more favourable terms.
While some employers may have an incentive to act in order to meet
employment equity goals under some legislation or contract compliance
programmes, others will not be so motivated, with the result that barriers
will continue to exist, unless there is a a successful human rights
complaint.
X. CONCLUSION
Seniority, like many other workplace institutions and practices,
will be affected by developing principles of equality in human rights
142 The British Columbia Supreme Court expressed a similar view in a case where the
employer and union settled a complaint of race discrimination: in GvRDEu v. British Columbia
(Council of Human Rights) (1993), 93 C.L.L.C. 17,029 at 16,284, Esson C.J. considered Renaud,
supra note 7, and stated that "it seems clear that Council could make an order requiring an
employer to hire a person who is found had been discriminated against, even if the hiring would
otherwise be a breach of the posting and seniority provisions of a collective agreement." However,
the Council had an obligation to allow the union to present arguments on the remedial issues, since
seniority rights were in issue.
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jurisprudence. While the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Renaud validates the importance of seniority and ensures ongoing
protection for acquired rights, it also reaffirms the fact that the concepts
of non-discrimination and the duty to accommodate require adjudicators
to balance competing interests, often in complex fact situations. As a
result, many exercises of seniority rights will remain unaffected by non-
discrimination precepts. Yet there will be some circumstances in which
seniority must be modified in the interests of greater equality of
opportunity for members of disadvantaged groups.
Even in the absence of a legal requirement to modify seniority,
the pursuit of a more equal workplace should lead unions and employers
to discuss ways to reduce the detrimental impact of seniority systems on
all groups. Thus, the decision reflected in the former Ontario legislation
to leave seniority rights out of the employment equity planning process,
without a finding that their use in promotions or hiring offends the
Ontario Human Rights Code, was regrettable.1 43 The complaint process
is slow, uncertain, and turns on the facts of a particular complaint. As
this article has shown, seniority can affect the pursuit of equality in many
ways, and there are often good reasons to consider its impact and
possible modification-even if its use is technically legal under human
rights law. In a society committed to fairer opportunities for
disadvantaged groups, it seems short-sighted, if not mean-spirited, to
excuse unions and employers from examining seniority systems, like
other employment measures, to see if adjustments are possible in the
interests of greater equality.144
1 4 3 The interpretation of the Ontario seniority provision is discussed by E. Shilton & A. Pask,
"The Role of Trade Unions and Employees Under the Employment Equity Act: A Preliminary
Overview" in Employment Equity: The Lawyer's Course (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada,
Continuing Legal Education Dept., 1994) at 14-17.
144 Therefore, the new federal legislation, supra note 4, s. 8(3), is an improvement in that it
requires parties to discuss the possibility of reducing the adverse impact of seniority systems.

